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ABSTRACT
Community detection is an important task in social network analysis,
allowing us to identify and understand the communities within the
social structures. However, many community detection approaches
either fail to assign low degree (or lowly-connected) users to com-
munities, or assign them to trivially small communities that prevent
them from being included in analysis. In this work, we investigate
how excluding these users can bias analysis results. We then intro-
duce an approach that is more inclusive for lowly-connected users
by incorporating them into larger groups. Experiments show that our
approach outperforms the existing state-of-the-art in terms of F1 and
Jaccard similarity scores while reducing the bias towards low-degree
users.
1 INTRODUCTION
Community detection is a fundamental task in social network analy-
sis [19], which identifies sub-groups within social networks. These
groups can represent a variety of things including karate club mem-
bership, political leanings, and deeply-held beliefs. Traditionally,
these groups are identified by searching for densely-connected groups
of nodes in the graph [14]. More recently, attributed approaches
go beyond merely the links to cluster nodes based upon their at-
tributes and their network connections [18]. Existing community
detection approaches suffer from a major flaw: the inability to as-
sign lowly-connected users into communities. Despite the fact that
lowly-connected users are not well-blended into the social network,
the information they provide can be crucial for better understanding
the motivations and beliefs of the community, especially consider-
ing there could be a long-tail of lowly-connected users. Failure to
incorporate the lowly-connected users may result in biased results.
For instance, studying groups within a social network, such as a
Twitter retweet network, can be biased towards users whose tweets
get a large number of retweets. This will lead to a biased analysis
of the data in which not all users’ voices are heard. Instead, those
high-degree users with non-genuine retweets will end up having
more voice in the study. Consider the toy example shown in Figure 1.
Each node represents a user and the shapes represent difference of
opinion in the network; the shade and different texture of each shape
represent their variability of expressing opinions. Traditional com-
munity detection methods that solely focus on the highly-connected
nodes would only capture the opinions of users within the dark-grey
area; however, many diverse opinions are lost due to the fact that the
users in the light grey area are excluded because of their low degree
in the network.
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we demonstrate empir-
ically the existence of biases in existing community detection ap-
proaches using real-world datasets. Through the analysis, we show
that current state-of-the-art community detection methods suffer
from ignoring low-degree users that have few links either by failing
to incorporate them, or by putting them into small groups which are
then ignored in the study. These low-degree users have value to be
included in the communities, as they offer a more diverse, nuanced
representation of the communities. Second, to overcome this issue,
we introduce a new community detection method, Communities with
Lowly-connected Attributed Nodes (CLAN), that would mitigate
the existence of this bias towards low-degree nodes.
Figure 1: Demonstration of versatility of relevant low-degree
people in social networks who get ignored by biased commu-
nity detection methods. Shapes (circle, triangle) represent opin-
ion, and texture represents variations of the opinion. We pro-
vide real-world examples of how this manifests in subsequent
sections.
Our contributions are as follows:
(1) We introduce CLAN, a novel community detection approach
that is able to categorize low-degree users into their relevant
communities.
(2) Through experimentation, we show that CLAN is able to
outperform the existing state-of-the-art community detection
methods in terms of predictive accuracy while still being able
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Gamergate Dataset U.S. Presidential Election Dataset
Method Discarded
Unique
Hashtags
Examples Discarded
Unique Hash-
tags
Examples
CESNA 597 (38.6%) #gamerignorance,#ethicsinjournalism,
#feministgate,#sexismiswickedcool
1518 (66.9%) #refugeeswelcome,
#Guns,#OscarsStillSoWhite, #Trump-
Dumped
Modularity 625 (40.4%) #misandricfeminists, #violenceagainst-
women,#gamersagainstgamergate,
#stopgamejournalism2014,
302 (13.3%) #Christians4Hillary,#Killary, #Fake-
HateCrimes, #TrumpRiots
Table 1: Number of missed hashtags which can be representative of missing information along with some examples in biased methods.
to classify more users. We conduct further experiments to test
the resiliency of CLAN to different data regimes.
(3) We demonstrate the existence of bias in community detection
approaches that is introduced from ignoring low-degree users.
We show that CLAN is able to overcome this challenge by
classifying low-degree users.
2 BIASES IN COMMUNITY DETECTION
METHODS
Analysis on community detection tends to focus on the largest com-
munities. Methods that tend to exclude low-degree nodes are at
greater risk of losing information in their detected significant com-
munities. We demonstrate the existence of this bias by showing
what is omitted by existing community detection approaches. We
use two state-of-the-art approaches, CESNA [21], and the Louvain
method [3]. Louvain uses only the network while assigning com-
munities, while CESNA uses both the network and user attributes.
We apply these methods to two separate datasets, one based on
Gamergate and one based on the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
Both of these datasets contain two major contingents, and ground
truth information (both datasets, and the methodology for obtain-
ing ground truth, will be introduced in detail later). Table 1 shows
the information that is omitted by excluding the lowly-connected
users. These statistics are taken by comparing the ground truth labels
with the labels assigned by the community detection algorithm. For
example, in one of the methods, CESNA, the “#refugeeswelcome”
hashtag and the user who tweeted this hashtag remained unlabeled
by the user being put in a small insignificant community from the
election dataset, discussed in the later sections. By not including this
user tweeting this hashtag, we lose this piece of information when
we analyze the communities. In other words, degree is not correlated
with relevancy to the topic and therefore merely degree and con-
nections in social networks should not be indicative of community
membership. Other examples of such are demonstrated in Table 1,
such as the “#Christians4Hillary,” “#gamersagainstgamergate,” and
many other hashtags of such type in two of the datasets that we will
be using in this paper. The goal of this work is to introduce a method
that would mitigate this bias by the inclusion of low-degree users
into their correct belonging significant communities.
3 RELATEDWORK
The related work will be discussed from two different perspectives.
First, we will discuss network sampling bias, and the consequences
thereof. Next, we will introduce state-of-the-art community detection
approaches with a special focus on those that we use as baselines in
this work.
There is a body of work surrounding different types of biases
in social networks, such as the retweet network [7, 13]. However,
these studies do not specify the root of the existing biases in social
networks and ways we can mitigate them through community de-
tection. In this paper, we show that the root of existing biases in
social networks come from not only the network structure but also
community detection methods that exemplify bias by putting lowly-
connected nodes into non-significant communities which leads to
their ignorance in the downstream studies of these communities.
Therefore, we analyze some state of the art community detection
methods and investigate their flaws and weaknesses.
Current community detection methods, such as relying on the
modularity value in network structures [3], suffer from bias of ig-
noring lowly-connected users. This is a type in which users with
non-genuine retweets get assigned to significant communities for sig-
nificant analysis, while users with low retweet rates get assigned to
non-significant groups which leads to their exclusion from the study.
On the other hand, some other community detection methods [21]
suffer from low recall scores due to their exclusion of users from
their belonging communities. Community detection methods with
low recall scores can suffer from incorporating bias by excluding so
many significant users. Although there are many different methods
for the community detection task [9, 17], we divided our analysis in
two different sections:
(1) Methods that do not use node attributes for the com-
munity detection task.
(2) Methods that use node attributes for the community
detection task.
Despite the fact that there are different methods that can go under
each of these two major groups discussed above, we picked the
two most well known and broadly used approaches to conduct our
analysis later in this paper.
3.1 Non-Attributed Methods
One of the widely used community detection methods is the Louvain
method, which utilizes the modularity value to obtain partitions by
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optimizing an objective function discussed in [3]. However, this
method tends to create small communities by putting introverted
and low-degree users into small communities which can be biased
towards low-degree people who are relevant by context to the signif-
icant groups but not connected through the network structure. The
results of such instances will be discussed in detail in the results
section of our proposed method, but we will give the reader a brief
overview of such cases in this section. Placement of low-degree
people into insignificant groups of their own may create the illusion
that these small communities are communities that are not so rele-
vant to the major groups that need to be studied and therefore can
be ignored, but we observed that these communities had so much
relevant and informative content to the study, based on our ground
truth labels, that it is crucial to keep them in the significant com-
munities. Merely low-degree rates and network structure should not
cause a user to be ignored. Low-connection in social networks may
be as a result of various factors. Consider the retweet network as an
example, low-connection may have different reasons, such as users
having unique ways of expressing ideas yet relevant to the majority
group’s opinion, the tweet content being long which tends to repel
other users to read and retweet them or in case of introverted users
with small friendship circles tweets may not get enough attention or
retweets. Network sampling can also change network measures and
create unrealistic introverted users [10, 15]. These reasons are not
indicative of irrelevancy of topic and should not cause bias towards
low-degree users of such types and their exclusion from significant
communities. Instead what the modularity value does is to separate
these users into introverted and small communities depriving them
from being into their correct significant communities by only focus-
ing on the network structure and its connections. Other methods of
such type that do not utilize node attributes exist, such as BigCLAM
and DEMON [6, 20]. Using node attributes in addition to the net-
work structure will add additional information, as discussed in [5],
and can be helpful to reduce this type of biases in social networks.
There are methods that use node attributes in combination with the
network structure to create communities. In the next section, we will
discuss some methods that utilize node attributes in addition to the
network structure and discuss issues associated with them and the
potential biases they create.
3.2 Attributed Methods
There are some attributed community detection methods discussed
in [8]. From which, one of the widely known methods that uses
node attributes in addition to the network structure is a generative
model called CESNA [21]. This method restructures the network by
incorporating node attributes. Experiments show that this method
performs well by having a high precision value; however, it suffers
from having a significantly low recall value. Low recall value may be
indicative that this method also discards some of the important users
which we are trying to avoid in order to minimize bias. In addition to
CESNA, other methods have been proposed, such as Block-LDA [2],
PAICAN [4], shared latent space models such as CLSM [5], and
embedding based approaches like LANE [12], which utilize node
attributes in order to detect communities, or ELAINE [11] which
utilizes edge attributes. However, none of these methods tried to
target the existing bias in social networks.
4 OBTAINING POPULATIONS FOR
COMMUNITY DETECTION
The populations used in this study are drawn from social media
with a particular focus on datasets with node attributes, such as text,
and a social network structure. Moreover, we want datasets where
the underlying communities come from different backgrounds. To
satisfy this, we utilized two different datasets: Gamergate and U.S.
Presidential Election. Both datasets have ground truth community
labels. Our process for obtaining these labels will be discussed in
detail.
4.1 Gamergate
The Gamergate dataset consists of tweets posted in 2014 between
months of August through October. The tweets surround the Gamer-
gate controversy [16]. It contains 21,441 users who collectively
produced 104,914 tweets. These users fall into one of the two groups
surrounding the controversy. One group consists of Gamergate sup-
porters who are tweeting about ethics in journalism and believe that
regardless of the relationship between journalists and game develop-
ers, journalists should give honest reviews to game developers. The
other group, Gamergate opposers, argues that Gamergate supporters
attack female game developers and also feminist critics, and that
they are not concerned with ethics in journalism, but are using the
opportunity to attack women in the gaming industry.
In this study, we conducted an Amazon Mechanical Turk experi-
ment discussed later in the paper to obtain ground truth labels for
each of the users in this controversy. The retweet network of this
dataset is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 2: The 2016 U.S. presidential election seed-user retweet
network colored by the political party from modularity. The
callout emphasizes the low-degree users.
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4.2 U.S. Presidential Election
This dataset contains 10,074 users who discuss the U.S. presidential
election in 2016. This dataset consists of two major groups which
indicate the political party of each user. This dataset comes from [1]
in which we only utilized the seed users from the whole dataset
which brought our dataset size down from more than million users
to 10,074 users since we required pure ground truth labels that were
obtained away from the network structure and label propagation.
The network structure of this dataset is shown in Figure 2.
5 OBTAINING GROUND TRUTH LABELS
FOR GAMERGATE
Unlike the 2016 presidential election dataset, the Gamergate dataset
inherently lacks ground truth labels for each user. To obtain them,
we conducted an Amazon Mechanical Turk experiment in which
we asked human annotators to assign labels to each user in the
Gamergate dataset.
5.1 Experimental Setup
In order to collect labels for each user in the Gamergate dataset, all
the tweets associated to a user were mapped to the particular user
so that the dataset was on a user level. Out of 21,441 total users,
we excluded users who had only single tweets and duplicated users
with same tweets. We then asked the turkers on Amazon Mechanical
Turk to label each of the 8,128 users left based on their tweets into
one of the following groups:
(1) Gamergate Supporter: Users fighting for ethics in journalism
and criticizing some women game-developers and journalists
for their unethical relationships.
(2) Gamergate Opposer: Users advocating for women’s rights
and protecting attacks from Gamergate supporters to female
game-developers and feminist advocates.
(3) Unaffiliated: Users who belong to neither of the groups.
Turkers were given complete description of the controversy and a
detailed explanation of the labeling procedure. In order to make sure
that the turkers were following the standards, some sanity check
questions were put under each page for us to be able to identify bot
turkers. These sanity check questions were trivial, made-up users
with tweets that were easy to be categorized into one of the three
groups, Gamergate Opposer, Gamergate Supporter, and Unaffiliated.
After identifying bot turkers and excluding their labels from the total
labels, we took the maximum agreement between 8,128 users that
were labeled by at least three turkers. This resulted in a new dataset
discussed in the next section which served as our ground truth.
5.2 Dataset
The Gamergate dataset had 21,441 users initially. In this study, we
consider only users who posted at least two original tweets. The
resulting dataset contains 8,128 users which were then labeled by
the turkers. After analyzing the Turker agreement between 8,128
labeled users, we considered only users where turkers agreed two
out of three times on a single label. After this filtering, we have
7,320 labeled users in total. These 7,320 users served as our ground
truth labels.
Figure 3: The Gamergate retweet network colored based on the
network structure is shown on the left hand side, and the net-
work colored by the ground truth labels is shown on the right
hand side. The callout zooms one of the components, showing
the disagreement between the two labeling approaches. Purple
nodes represent Gamergate opposers and green nodes represent
Gamergate supporters.
5.3 Results
After obtaining the ground truth labels and having three ground
truth groups of users, Gamergate supporters, Gamergate opposers,
and unaffiliated, the communities obtained using network attributes
were then compared with the groups obtained by the labels from
the Mechanical Turk experiment. Surprisingly these results had a
very low agreement which will be discussed in detail in "Community
Detection Results" section. Figure 2 confirms this fact by showing
the disagreement between the left hand side picture, which is col-
ored based on the network structure, and the picture on the right
colored by the ground truth labels. There is a significant amount of
disagreement between these two results. The purple nodes represent
Gamergate opposers and the green nodes represent Gamergate sup-
porters. Using network structure and attributes would put almost all
of Gamergate supporters in the green portion of the network and
Gamergate opposers in the purple section of the network completely
separated; however, the ground truth labels tend to have mixed users
into each of the sections. The ground truth results are expected as
many opposers may retweet Gamergate supporters; therefore, us-
ing network attributes merely on the retweet network might not
be a good idea for separating these users, and other attributes and
characteristics of users can be used for a more accurate community
detection task. These results illustrate the fact that network does not
explain everything and additional information is required in order to
obtain accurate communities of users. This motivated us to come up
with a new method that would not only address the bias from creat-
ing small communities and exclusion of low-degree nodes but would
also have higher agreement with the ground truth communities by
using other node attributes in addition to the network structure which
will be discussed in the next section.
6 PROPOSED METHOD
We have confirmed that ignoring low-degree users introduces bias
into the resulting analysis of the data. In light of this, we propose a
community detection approach that addresses the following issues:
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Algorithm 1 CLAN
Input:
1: Network
2: Threshold
Output: Communities
// Step 1: Finding the communities
C = find_communities(Network)
// Step 2: Classifying minority users into significant communities
for Ci in C do
if count(Ci ) > Threshold then
Add Ci to training set
else
Add Ci to test set
end if
model = train(training set)
end for
predictions = model.inference(test set)
for p in predictions do
if p.label == Ci then
Add p.data to Ci
end if
end for
return C
(1) Bias against low-degree nodes: Creating numerous
small communities from putting introverted users
in them results in the exclusion of those users from
many data analysis tasks which creates a bias against
these lowly-connected users. This bias is in favor
of bots that would get potential falsified retweets
and attention in the network, while it would exclude
introverted users with less friends entirely.
(2) Bias from low recall: Having low recall may mean
exclusion of some users which is not desirable since
we want to be able to maintain all the users for a
more accurate study of the dataset no matter how
hard it is to put them into their appropriate commu-
nities. We should not be able to only identify the
popular users correctly but all the users regardless
of their popularity in the network.
(3) Higher predictive accuracy of the resulting commu-
nities. While addressing these issues, we simultane-
ously want to improve the accuracy of the commu-
nities discovered by our method.
We introduce CLAN: Communities from Lowly-connected Attrib-
uted Nodes which addresses the mentioned above issues as follows:
(1) CLAN uses additional node attributes other than net-
work attributes, such as text, to classify the lowly-
connected users that were put into the small commu-
nities, those are the communities that are small in
terms of containing users but large in number since
they contain introverted and disconnected users who
are mostly ignored due to the false belief that in-
troverted users have irrelevant content in their text
compared to the highly-connected users, into the sig-
nificant communities that contain highly-connected
users who get most of the attention in methods that
solely focus on the network structure.
(2) By not changing the network structure and only
adding information to this structure through the addi-
tional node attributes, such as text utilization, results
obtained from CLAN would tend to have higher
recall values.
(3) From the reasons given in 1 and 2, we will show in
our results through experimentation that CLAN has
a superior performance and in a higher agreement
with the ground truth communities.
CLAN uses node attributes to incorporate the introverted and lowly-
connected users into their correct communities. Therefore, instead
of creating small communities and putting these users into these
insignificant communities by mistake, CLAN tends to utilize node
attributes, in our case text attributes, to correctly put users into major
communities that are significant to different down stream tasks. This
would reduce the bias that will cause these users to be excluded
from the data analysis tasks. In addition to that, by correctly utiliz-
ing these additional node attributes without changing the network
structure, CLAN would obtain higher recall values and generally
more accurate results that would be in a higher agreement with the
ground truth communities while staying computationally more effi-
cient. The CLAN algorithm is a two step process, in which we first
use unsupervised learning to develop communities using network
attributes and modularity value. Once we have the communities, we
would then turn the problem into a supervised classification problem
in which we would classify the introverted users from insignificant
communities into the major communities using additional node at-
tributes that were held out in the first step, such as text attributes
associated to a user. The first step of this process is a straightfor-
ward process in which we utilized the Louvain method discussed
in [3]. Note that any community detection task that only utilizes the
network, such as BigCLAM and DEMON [6, 20], can replace this
step which makes our algorithm flexible,general, and also capable of
handling overlapping communities. Once this method is applied and
the communities are obtained, we train a classifier on the majority
communities using node attributes as features. The introvert users
will then be classified into the majority groups that were used in
our training process. The features can be any held out node features,
such as text or hashtags that each user used in their tweets. Unlike
most of the generative methods that create new networks by com-
bining network attributes and node attributes, we do not recreate the
whole network structure, but we only add information to the existing
network without changing its fundamental structure. This can also
make our algorithm computationally more efficient than generative
models which recreate the network.
7 COMMUNITY DETECTION RESULTS
Our goal is to report quantitative and qualitative results obtained
through different experimentation in this paper. Hence, we use dif-
ferent visualizations and examples from datasets in hand, in addition
to our numerical results to give the reader a better intuition of how
our method, CLAN, performs compared to the existing state of the
art.
Mehrabi, et al.
Gamergate Dataset U.S. Presidential Election Dataset
Method F1 Score Jaccard F1 Score Jaccard
CESNA 0.343 0.211 0.253 0.149
Modularity 0.434 0.282 0.753 0.604
CLAN 0.478 0.318 0.787 0.649
Table 2: The quantitative results obtained from calculating the F1 and Jaccard similarity scores with regards to the ground truth
labels for each of the methods.
Unlabeled Users
Method Gamergate Dataset U.S. Presidential Election Dataset
CESNA 69% 95%
Modularity 21% 20%
CLAN 0% 0%
Table 3: Percentage of unlabeled users in each of the methods.
7.1 Evaluation Metrics
For evaluation purposes, the F1 and Jaccard similarity scores are
calculated for each of the datasets with respect to the ground truth
labels. These scores are the average values of the total communities
found in each of the datasets.
7.1.1 Quantitative Results. In this section, we would report
quantitative and numerical results from our experiments. We will first
report the scores for the F1 and Jaccard similarity scores between
the ground truth labels and three different methods. We will show
that CLAN outperforms other methods in terms of F1 and Jaccard
similarity scores for both of the datasets. Table 2 contains results for
the F1 and Jaccard similarity scores obtained from comparisons done
between the ground truth labels and labels obtained by applying each
of the methods on the two datasets on hand.
In addition to reporting the F1 and Jaccard score results from
the ground truth comparisons, we conducted another experiment
in which we report the results indicating the number of the users
that were labeled by each of the methods. These numbers show
the number of users that the method has excluded by not labeling
them. This exclusion shows the bias of the method towards those
users. Therefore, the more unlabeled users a method has the more
susceptible to bias it is. In Table 3, we reported the percentage of the
users who were left unlabeled or put in insignificant communities
in each of the methods from the two datasets. These results confirm
the fact that our method, CLAN, has mitigated the bias towards the
introverted users by incorporating them into the significant commu-
nities which would not be excluded from various down stream data
analysis tasks.
The two sets of results reported in Tables 2 and 3 confirm that not
only is our method able to achieve superior predictive accuracy but
also mitigate bias against introverted users by assigning them labels
preventing them from exclusion.
7.1.2 Qualitative Results. Besides the numerical results re-
ported in the previous subsection, we want to further our analysis by
Figure 4: Networks colored by agreement with the ground truth labels for three methods for the Gamergate dataset.
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Gamergate Tweet CESNA Label Modularity Label CLAN Label Ground Truth Label
“#gamergate is like a particularly lame version of
pakistani twitter political flame wars like ridicu-
lously lame"
N/A N/A Anti Gamergate Anti Gamergate
“#gamergate is brutally put in its place by a journal-
ist“
N/A N/A Anti Gamergate Anti Gamergate
“#gamergate #done i suspect the #ottawashoot-
ing has more in common with #montrealmassacre
#columbine #gamergate than it does with #islam“
N/A N/A Anti Gamergate Anti Gamergate
“#gamergate i support #gamergate and #notyour-
shield i stand against harassment threats and doxxing
no matter who or why“
N/A N/A Gamergate Sup-
porter
Gamergate
Supporter
“#gamergate #extralife2014 only two more days un-
til our stream starts are you hyped we sure are current
score to beat 100. I just supported #gamergate extra
life charity“
N/A Gamergate Sup-
porter
Gamergate Sup-
porter
Gamergate
Supporter
Table 4: Sample Gamergate users with their corresponding tweets and labels assigned to each user by the three methods. “N/A”means
that the method failed to classify the user.
showing some visualized results and real examples drawn from our
datasets to further prove our results from the previous subsection.
We will start our qualitative results by showing a visualization of
the retweet network in the Gamergate dataset in the three methods
discussed in this paper. Each node in these graphs represent a user
and the nodes are color coded based on their agreement with the
ground truth labels. The green nodes represent agreement between
the label that was assigned to that particular user obtained from the
method used and the ground truth label, and the red node represent
disagreement between the two labels associated to that node. There-
fore, more green nodes in a graph represent the degree of agreement
of that method with the ground truth label and generally its superior-
ity in terms of agreement with the ground truth compared to the other
methods. The results of these visualizations are shown in Figure 4.
In addition to disagreement, the red nodes may also represent the
fact that a method has low recall value and that many users were
assigned no labels while the ground truth has assigned it a label. This
of course is a sort of disagreement between the labels, so the nodes
are colored as red. As expected, CESNA would have many red nodes
as this method tends to have a very low recall value and as shown in
Table 3, this method has a high tendency to exclude many users by
not assigning them a label. Therefore, it suffers from low agreement
with the ground truth and as expected highly covered by red nodes.
This also confirms the existence of bias towards these red users who
suffered from CESNA’s low recall issue. The result associated to this
method is shown on the far right side of Figure 4. As we move to the
next method in the middle of Figure 4, we see less red nodes. This
is because using modularity value has a higher recall and generally
more agreement with the ground truth, but one can still spot many
red users in this method. Moving on to the last graph on the far left
side of Figure 4, we can see the graph associated to CLAN. Due to
CLAN’s use of node attributes in addition to the network attributes,
it is able to obtain higher agreement with the ground truth and there-
fore less red nodes compared to the previous method. CLAN was
able to address many red nodes in the top portion as well as the
bottom portion of the graph compared to the modularity method. In
addition to the agreement graphs shown in Figure 4, we provided
two sets of tables, Table 4 and 5, in which some examples from each
of the datasets are provided where it shows how each of the methods
labeled a particular user with sets of tweets they tweeted. The ground
truth labels are also listed for comparison purposes. Table 4 contains
the results from the Gamergate dataset, while Table 5 contains the
results for the 2016 presidential election dataset. These examples
also highlight the fact that the baseline approaches are suffering from
the type of bias that roots from exclusion of users by not assigning
2016 U.S. Presidential Election Tweet CESNA Label Modularity Label CLAN Label Ground Truth Label
“Trump wants to ban Muslim immigrants like my
parents. I wrote a piece for telling him to go fuck
himself.“
N/A N/A Democrat Democrat
“Frauds at NY Times coverup Hillary’s serious
crimes...but try to make Trump into a criminal for
LEGAL tax reduction strategy. WOW.“
N/A Republican Republican Republican
“Fox News Host Makes Hillary Supporter Admit
That Clinton Foundation Is A Huge Scam.“
Democrat Republican Republican Republican
Table 5: Sample 2016 U.S. Presidential Election users with their corresponding tweets and labels assigned by the three methods.
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Figure 5: Synthetic distributions with their corresponding network and obtained results for the Gamergate dataset.
them any labels or putting them into insignificant communities that
would be excluded.
The qualitative results reported in this subsection also confirm the
fact that the baseline methods have low agreement with the ground
truth labels and suffer from bias towards low-degree and some users
who are excluded from being labeled. The results from this and
previous subsection also show the superiority of our method in terms
of addressing these issues through various examples provided.
8 CLAN’S RESILIENCE TO SKEWED DATA
One potential issue with community detection is that it could com-
pletely ignore entire communities if membership in that community
is correlated with degree. For example, a community of introverts is
likely to be overlooked because they do not form many links. This
presents a challenge to our approach as well, because Step 1 consists
of identifying the major communities in the dataset. In order to test
our method against this potential drawback, we conducted an ex-
periment in which methods discussed in this paper would be tested
in a synthetic environment in which the community distribution is
skewed according to degree. This experiment serves two goals. First,
it would compare the methods in terms of their performance on a
different set of data. Secondly, it would show our method’s behavior
along with other methods while the distribution of each dataset is
changed in terms of the node degree in the network which correlates
with the popularity of a user in the social network.
8.1 Experimental Setup
In this experiment, we subsampled each dataset so that community
membership is determined as a function of degree. Nodes with a
particular degree are subsampled so that the statistic in Equation 1
follows a particular trend. For example, in the Gamergate dataset, we
changed the distribution such that the graph observed from plotting
the degree vs. fraction of users in each of the two distinct groups,
Gamergate supporter vs. Gamergate opposer, would have a particular
trend. The same procedure was followed for the U.S. election dataset
with its two groups being the political party a user was following.NGamerдate Suppor terD=i NGamerдate OpposerD=i  and
NDemocratD=i NRepublicanD=i  (1)
In Figure 5, the original distribution of the Gamergate dataset is
shown on the top right corner of the figure with its corresponding
network colored with the modularity value, and one of the synthetic
distributions with a particular slope is shown in the bottom left with
its corresponding network representation. Figure 6 contains the same
graphs and networks for the U.S. Presidential Election dataset.
8.2 Results
The results for the Gamergate and U.S. Presidential Election datasets
are shown in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. The graphs located in
the top left corner of the figures show the Jaccard similarity scores
for each of the distributional settings, and the graph on the bottom
left corner contains the results for the F1 scores. The networks
shown under each of the slope values in Figures 5 and 6 are the
network of the users in the new distributional environments that have
that particular slope range values. This confirms the fact that under
different degree distributional settings CLAN can have reasonable
and superior performance over the state of the art methods.
Debiasing Community Detection: The Importance of Lowly-Connected Nodes
Figure 6: Synthetic distributions with their corresponding network and obtained results for the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
dataset.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we introduce a new community detection method that
mitigates the bias in existing detection methods that fail to properly
account for sparsely-connected nodes in social networks. CLAN
minimizes such biases by including the lowly-connected nodes into
their true communities. Our empirical results demonstrate that in-
clusion of those users enables CLAN to achieve overall superior
performance in terms of F1-score and Jaccard similarity. We re-
ported these results by providing evidence through our qualitative
and quantitative experiments. Through qualitative analysis, we are
able to show that these lowly-connected users, in aggregate, offer
information that can be of use for analysis of social network data.
Finally, we show that our method is capable of outperforming
other methods not only in real datasets but also in different types
of synthetic environments with different population distributions,
namely distributions where the users community is correlated with
their connectivity. The results reported the performance of methods
with regards to F1 and Jaccard similarity scores.
We see two promising directions for future work. First, to extend
this method to introduce a new hierarchical community detection
method capable of detecting subgroups within larger communities.
Second, we would like to consider edge attributes simultaneously
with node attributes to enable this method to consider different types
of connections.
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